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8
Improving American Foreign
Financial and Food Assistance Policies
to Enhance Food Security
Raymond F. Hopkins

The Domestic Policy Environment for
Foreign and Food Assistance

Generally, four kinds of donor assistance may serve to strengthen
another country’s food security. Such assistance is especially
important in countries vulnerable to food shortages, with their
attendant high internal prices and increased hunger.
1. Project financial assistance directed to agricultural projects
or to inputs, such as fertilizer or research, to improve the
agricultural productivity of a country.
2. Food aid can eliminate temporary shortages. Imported food
on a free or concessional basis should enhance supply and,
if provided in a reliable, compensatory fashion, smooth
supply availability and the threat of acute hunger.
3. Nonproject development assistance. This is most often
provided in support of policy reform measures or to help a
country’s structural adjustment programs and can be used
to pay for food imports needed to satisfy minimal security
requirements.
4. Renegotiation and reduction of debt obligations can improve
a country’s food security by reducing its general vulnerability
283
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to international and national market fluctuations in the longer
run. Debt forgiveness may be a sine qua non for economic
development.
These four pathways by which external assistance affects food
security, whether through official aid flows or debt adjustment, can
all be affected by a recipient country’s production, import needs,
and role in international trade, and that country’s domestic policies
on food subsidies. The changing context of each recipient is
therefore cmcial for assessing the “true” effect of aid on food security.
This chapter focuses on the first two of these flows, and partic
ularly the second, food aid. It discusses these in the environment
of the American food aid program. Generally, the domestic and
international factors that affect food aid from the United States and
the international purposes and interests that the United States has
sought to serve have changed since the inaugural of the food aid,
or PL 480, legislation in 1954; further changes in environmental
factors invite further changes in American policy in the 1990s.
I Two basic purposes of the U.S. government in continuing to
/allocate scarce foreign affairs budget resources in order to send
/foodstuffs overseas are (1) to enhance domestic agricultural interests
in the United States and (2) to alleviate constraints on development
in other countries rising from food shortages and malnutrition. Given
these two purposes it is understandable that USDA and AID are the
major executive branch agencies responsible for food aid, and
equally logical that the agriculture and foreign affairs committees
of Congress are its principal legislative authors.
The political saliency of its purposes has not remained constant,
however. As the proportion of food aid in total agricultural exports
for the United States has declined from over 30 percent in the 1950s
to less than 5 percent in the 1980s, its benefits to American food
producers and the U.S. treasury through reduced costs for commodity
storage programs have dwindled. Coincident with this dwindling
stake in food aid has been a decline in the power of agricultural
interests supporting it. With growing urbanization—^as the American
population has shifted away from farm and agricultural
employment—combined with the effects of the Supreme Court
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decision proscribing unequal electoral constituencies that had
favored rural areas—the power of agricultural interests within the
U.S. government has eroded. The political context in the 1990s for
PL 480, therefore, is far different from what existed in 1953-54 when
the initial food aid legislation was drawn up and its share of treasury
funds was first negotiated.
The second factor shaping American interests in food aid is that
of contributing to the global “collective good” of stabilizing
international markets and guaranteeing populations in poor countries
access to minimally adequate nutrition. Evidence suggests this has
been a steady and growing policy concern. Reasons for this trend
include (1) the enhanced capacity to transport and deliver food to
remote areas around the world and to respond quickly to anticipated
needs (over the last two decades early warning networks have been
developed to forecast famines); (2) concern over domestic
agricultural policies that may destabilize markets, a problem
especially for very poor or very indebted food importers; and (3) a
growing normative consensus that hunger is an unacceptable
element of the human condition in the last decade of the twentieth
century.*
Implications of these two changes, declining domestic producer
interests and rising global food stabilization and hunger interests,
combined with lessons derived from the cumulative experience and
research in food aid over the last 35 years lead to a strong case for
revising the entire PL 480 program.^
This chapter is divided into three sections: it elaborates upon
the historical trends already described; it discusses some of the costs
and benefits associated with food aid, in particular, for trade and
development purposes; and it offers some practical steps appropriate
for the future design of American food and financial aid related to
food security.
Origins and Changes in PL 480

In 1954, a coalition of cold war, farm commodity, and human
itarian interests supported the creation of a special U.S. government
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program of noncommercial food sales and donations. Although the
United States regularly had provided such aid after World War II, it
was not institutionalized (outside the Mutual Security Act) until Public
Law 480 of 1954. This law reflected the belief that food aid could
simultaneously serve the needs of reducing the costs of our domestic
farm programs and, at the same time, serve relief and development
interests. America’s internationally oriented leaders saw food aid
supporting both the humanitarian concerns of Americans to avoid
starvation and famine and, more broadly, resistance to the
“communist menace.” Senator Hubert Humphrey claimed that U.S.
surpluses could be “a great asset for checking communist aggression.
Communism has no greater ally than hunger; and democracy and
freedom no greater ally than an abundance of food (Ruttan 1989).
Following the enactment of PL 480, President Eisenhower created
an interagency committee to oversee this program reflecting the
multiple objectives of the legislation. It was chaired by the
Department of Agriculture with representatives from the Departments
of State and Defense, the agency for foreign aid (after 1961, the
Agency for International Development—^AID), the Treasury, and the
Budget Bureau (now OMB).
Unfortunately, neither the legislation nor the interagency process
created a harmonious marriage among interests. The very division
of food aid into two disbursement channels, a Title I program,
primarily steered by USDA and the State Department, and a Title II
program, primarily aimed at supporting humanitarian and
development objectives, and in recent years steered by AID (with
special ties to voluntary agencies in this country), acknowledges
the likelihood that particular food transfers cannot serve all of PL
480’s mandated purposes simultaneously.
A 1977-78 review of food aid, carried out by the Carter
administration, considered the desirability of allocating fixed pro
portions of the food aid budget to particular mandates. This idea
was rejected in favor of maintaining a diffuse coalition of interests
and purposes within the legislation. At least some food aid, it was
felt, could simultaneously serve multiple purposes. Much has
changed since this review over 10 years ago, however. Conflicts
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over the shrinking foreign assistance budget and the uncertainty of
surpluses have made food aid much closer to a fully funded cost
for the United States as it is for other countries (Clay and Singer
1985).
Since its beginning as a surplus disposal, anticommunist effort
of the United States, the underlying character of the international
food aid “regime” (i.e., the structure and rules for governing the
transactions that encompass the entire set of donors and recipients)
has changed dramatically. Furthermore, the burden-sharing has
shifted. The U.S. contribution, for example, has fallen: from
providing more than 95 percent of the world’s food aid, the United
States now provides between 50 and 60 percent (in dollar terms
the U.S. contribution is less than 50 percent). Other bilateral and
multilateral donors now have a significant role. Other donors and
recipients now set rules and pressure the United States over regime
elements (World Food Program 1979).
In 1963, an international organization, the World Food Program
(WFP), was created to conduct a special portion of food aid, that
is, aid to be used in projects within recipient states that would help
people improve their lives, particularly in agriculture. The WFP in
1974 was authorized to expand its authority under a new
international committee, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and
Programs (CFA), which serves as an overall body to establish
principles for food aid and to provide guidance to donors and
recipients of food aid. This “governing” task was added to the CFA’s
regular charge to approve particular food aid projects supported
by the multilateral WFP.
By 1990, the regime expanded to the point where more than 25
countries provided food and over 100 received it. Under the Food
Aid Convention (FAC), established in 1967 as part of the Kennedy
GATT negotiations and most recently renewed in 1986, the United
States is obliged to provide a minimum of 4.47 million metric tons
(mmt) of food aid while other principal donors to the FAC have
pledged another 3 mmt. Ironically, in spite of greater burden sharing
among rich states, thus expanding the wealth base for paying for
food aid, the physical volume of food aid in tonnage terms has
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declined. As the burden of providing it became more widely
accepted and carried out by other OECD countries, the U.S. effort
shrank.
In 1966, a reform of U.S. food aid shifted the emphasis of food
aid’s purposes toward economic development. It required countries
receiving food aid to establish self-help measures to be funded by
sales of concessional food. These changes arose in part as a result
of concern that food aid could hurt recipient countries through
disincentive effects upon local production. Disincentives might be
created by weakening a government’s interest in providing funding
for research for the food and agriculture sector, by lowering market
prices for foods and thereby decreasing food producers income and
incentives, and finally by creating tastes for imported foods, such
as wheat and rice, that are relatively expensive and/or impossible
to produce locally, thus creating an unnecessary dependence.
Food aid allocations also have changed. Over the years, par
ticular interests, sometimes famine alleviation, other times the desire
to reinforce foreign policy actions or even support military
operations, have played a compelling role in the U.S.’s allocation
of food. For example, in the mid-1960s and again in the mid-1980s,
famines in India and Africa caused substantial shifts and increases
in the size of food aid. Conversely, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
use of food aid as a resource to support the American military effort
in Southeast Asia became important. These latter allocative shifts
resulted from bureaucratic politics within the United States.
Today further reforms are advocated. Much as the ones ad
vanced in 1966, based on the results of research and evaluations
over the last two decades, in 1990 a revamping of food aid was
proposed, by Senators Leahy and Lugar, with support from
humanitarian groups (Minear 1989) and from domestic farm groups.
Food problems in sub-Saharan Africa provide the most pressing
examples of why reform has been called for. This region has come
to absorb the largest share of food aid over the last 15 years. Per
capita food production declined in Africa from 1970 to 1983 by 17
percent. This was a major factor in the general economic malaise
of that period. For food aid to help solve food problems that hinder
African development, experts have increasingly argued that such
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aid must be designed to improve national food markets and foster
local development actions. Indeed, the U.S. Food for Progress
Program was proclaimed with just this link to food in mind.
For food aid to be constructive, especially in the poorer African
countries, it is clear that longer term planning, larger resource flows,
and formal multiyear commitments are required. How much food
aid can African and similar countries absorb? To guard against
disincentive effects in its local production, a conservative approach
to an estimate would be simply to project “demanded” imports above
the average level of commercial imports in the 1980s. For Africa,
for example, 4 to 5 million additional tons could be justified. Thanks
to the enormous African debt burden, only moderate growth of food
imports to Africa is projected, but even these are surely not affordable
on a commercial basis (NAS 1989). Imports by the poorer developing
countries during the 1980s that required foreign exchange are a
reasonable indicator of what economic demand and hence
absorptive capacity were available without displacing local
production.
For Africa, about half or more of projected import increases cited
in a recent National Academy of Sciences workshop may require
some aid to finance them. An adequate response to the “need” gap
would require grants be tripled to support food imports to Africa.
For all food deficit countries where reform measures are moving in
directions urged by the United States and the World Bank, an
increase in callable food guarantees would be especially deserved,
particularly as a compensatory way to balance food needs and
prevent shortages. For African countries alone, food aid could
increase by $500 million (1989 price) per year, I believe, without
violating the spirit of usual marketing requirements set to protect
commercial interests.
Successful food aid requires multiyear commitments. Each
country’s use would work best if the agreement regulating the aid
allowed the resource flow to change from year to year in size, type
of food commodity, and even between food and cash. For example,
if Guinea or Madagascar were to have a banner year in rice
production, then donors need the flexibility to switch their plans,
perhaps to send them less rice and substitute another food such as
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wheat and/or cash. This would be appropriate as a reward for their
“success.” To continue to send food that is not needed or may
overwhelm their markets is hardly a reward for successful adjustment
or a good crop year.
Major price instabilities strike economies of African states when
food production varies much over 10 percent. During the recent
1984-85 drought, cereal production fell as much as 50 percent in
some countries and overall staple food production by 15 to 25
percent. Per capita food production in Africa is not only the lowest
in the world, but variability in production (1970-86) is high, exceeded
only by the Soviet Union. Thus, reducing vulnerability of poor states
through a flexible, procyclical food aid program is crucial.
In food insecure states, because of the importance of food in
employment and in household expenditures, instabilities in pro
duction can wreak havoc in national economic life and in individual
lives. Populations in areas hardest hit by shortages migrate,
burdening other regions and causing the loss of capital resources
as in Chad, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in recent years. Terms of
trade are drastically altered; wealthy herders become impoverished.
Employment shrinks, demand for nonfood goods falls, and the
formal economy is increasingly circumvented by informal exchanges.
Even in years when national food production is normal, large
numbers of Africans and Asians can be affected by regional
variations.
Based on this type of need, quite different from that of Mexico
and other food-importing, debt-ridden, but partly industrialized
states, and also different from that of 20 years ago, a high priority
for food aid should be as a resource for improving weak food
markets. Past U.S. rules and practices regarding food aid, however,
have made this priority difficult to accomplish. Why? First, the
interagency working group has usually had inadequate information
about failures in food policy and insufficient leverage or assurance
of covering risks in policy change to nurture market improvement.
The effort to use food aid in support of a grain market restructuring
in Mali is the major exception, and that effort was set back by the
1984-85 dropout. The multiple objectives of PL 480 make market
stabilization adjustments at odds (sometimes) with other goals.
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In many recipients, unfortunately not only in Africa, policy
reforms to improve the food system have been lacking or have been
made reluctantly. Food aid should support, not undercut, policy
reform. This requires coordination with other donors and fitting
U.S. food aid into larger reform financing. A shift toward greater
coordination, multilateral aid, and integrating food and cash
assistance would fit the changed understanding of food system
reforms necessary in the 1990s.
Analyzing Costs and Benefits

The changes in the nature of food aid from the 1950s to the
1980s, sketched out above, raise some basic questions as to its future
- size and modality (see NAS 1989). Clearly, the benefits it provided
to some groups, such as grain producers in exporting countries, have
declined. Fortunately, the costs it may have imposed on recipients
through distorting their economy are also likely to have declined.
This in turn has shifted the extent to which various interests are
served or disadvantaged by food aid. The climate within which
policy is made, therefore, has similarly changed.
Academic studies have given the most attention to the effects
of food aid (for example, the benefits and costs) to recipient
countries. Disincentive, distribution, and distortion effects have
received wide criticism (Maxwell and Singer 1979). Relatively less
attention has been paid to the costs and benefits to donor countries.
These, however, are central to understanding the motivation for food
aid, and important in formulating recommendations regarding its
future size and modalities in an era of shrinking budgets.
What are the benefits of food aid to the United States? Basically,
food aid may be construed as an international public good, differing
from cash as being tied (doubly tied when the United States insists
that its food be used). In this sense, as argued earlier, the public
good of stability is a U.S. interest advanced. It should or can advance
the U.S. interest as a major stakeholder in a peaceful global order
and its interest in international economic development and trade
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expansion, especially as the economic situation deteriorated in the
1980s.
What is the monetary cost of food aid supplied by the United
States, either bilaterally or through international agencies? A simple
answer, and one conventionally used for international accounting
purposes, is to value the quantity of food at current world prices,
the market price. Thus, the value of 10,000 tons of wheat or cooking
oil, as recorded by foreign aid bookkeepers, is its cost on the open
world market, either f.o.b. or c.i.f., as circumstances of the transfer
dictate. Often, however, this price is not a good estimate of the
value that donors give up. Thus, other valuations have been used
over the years in the bookkeeping of food aid. Each of these plays
a role in understanding the true economic costs to supplying
countries.
The highest cost that might be used in assigning a value to food
aid commodities is their acquisition or treasury cost. During times
when domestic farm policy supports higher prices, a government
intervenes in the market to acquire surpluses of the commodity.
Thus, in the Common Market, for example, domestic-oriented actions
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have generated mountains
of butter and powdered milk, while in the United States the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) has frequendy held large grain
stocks. The acquisition costs of such commodities and subsequent
costs of storage can result in government outlays substantially higher
than the market values of the commodities.
If donor governments use their full budgetary outlays for valuing
commodities that are subsequently shipped as food aid, the apparent
cost of food aid seems rather high. Indeed, in the United States in
the early years of PL 480 aid, the Commodity Credit Corporation’s
costs were often used to report the value of food aid. In more recent
years, especially in reports to those interested in economic
development, the value of early food aid has been recalculated to
reflect prevailing international commercial prices. Similarly, the
European Community reports the international value of its food, not
the costs incurred by the various European intervention agencies.
With the decline of large government-held surpluses of grain in
the 1970s and again in the late 1980s, this high-priced method of
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valuing food aid has become less relevant. Still, to appease some
domestically oriented policymakers, especially when domestic prices
are higher than international prices and when substantial government
storage charges may be incurred, there may be advantages to
charging the international assistance budget the cost needed to cover
some part of government outlays for the food provided as aid.
Moreover, congressmen representing farm interests, frequently in
the 1950s, were happy to construe the full value and cost of the PL
480 program as part of America’s international welfare contribution
and not as a cost of domestic farm programs (White 1974). This is
no longer true; indeed, global-oriented congressional leaders can
now count on support for aid tied to food from “farm” members of
Congress regardless of the arrangements.
At the other extreme, considering only alternative uses for the
food, zero has sometimes been suggested as the appropriate cost
for providing food. When aid is drawn from surplus commodities,
as under Section 4l6 of the Farm Bill (1949), this is the value charged
to the foreign assistance account. At the level of the national
economy, this valuation rests on the premise that, besides the means
of disposing of this food as aid, the only effective option open to
government agencies holding large surplus stocks would be to
destroy them.
Still another way to assess the economic cost of food aid to the
donor is in terms of opportunity costs. In this case, the potential
additional costs for farm subsidy programs in the absence of food
aid are deducted from the treasury cost to the government for food
aid. Leo Mayer calculated in the 1966-68 period that the net cost of
PL 480 programs was considerably below apparent government
(CCC) costs and below world market prices. The net government
cost, according to Mayer’s calculations, was reached by reducing
CCC costs by the amount the CCC would have had to pay out in
set-aside payments to farmers in order to idle the amount of land
used to produce the amount of food aid shipped. Thus, he found
that the average net cost to the government of wheat food aid in
1966-68 was 49 percent of its gross costs (Mayer 1972). More
recently, a USDA study calculated PL 480 costs as less than full value,
but higher than set-aside costs to reduce the same amount of
“surpluses” (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988).
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The alternative chosen for calculating donor costs is important
for several reasons. First, it affects the publicly perceived budgetary
burden. Second, it can affect repayment obligations if it is a Title Itype arrangement. Finally, it can affect the volume of food aid a
particular donor can supply to the extent volume is capped by dollars
allocated. Thus, in 1986-88, food authorized under Section 4l6 for
food aid 480 use was a free addition to the foreign aid budget (except
for shipping).
All donors, including the United States, budget their food aid in
monetary, not volume, terms. Other donors, however, add funds
to meet tonnage goals when prices rise. The United States generally
has not done so. This is largely because U.S. legal food aid
requirements under Title II subminimums and commitments under
the FAC are lower than available funds for food aid. Other donors
usually just meet fixed tonnage pledges. Great Britain or Australia,
for instance, simply adjust their development budget allocations
upward (or downward) to meet changing food prices for set tonnage
and the adjustment is usually borne by the rest of the development
assistance budget.
Aside from the cost of the commodity, another PL 480 cost is
the management and personnel expenses required to run a food
aid program. Managing food aid requires some additional staff and
management expenses that the government would not otherwise
have incurred. In the United States, which has a very large
bureaucracy at home and abroad working for both the Agency for
International Development and the Department of Agriculture, it may
be argued that some of the costs of managing food aid are fixed
and would otherwise go for staff salaries whether food aid were
provided or not. Moreover, the size of the Washington-based food
aid bureaucracy compared to the value of the program makes it one
of the smaller in government for each dollar spent. Indeed, as one
agriculture department official remarked, no other billion-dollar
program in the United States government has so few staff members.
Aside from salary costs for personnel, another conceivable cost
would be the attention time required of high-level administrators.
This is relatively small. Seldom do food aid issues and controversies
rise to the level of department secretaries or the White House.
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Programming or budgetary issues, even when they have generated
complicated and heated intragovemmental bargaining, have seldom
diverted the attention of top government leaders. Perhaps the only
occasions for this in recent years occurred in 1974, when pledges
for the World Food Conference required approval at the highest
level, and in 1984-85 when the White House gave attention to
responses to African famine conditions.
Food aid benefits the United States in both economic and political
ways. In the economic realm, benefits are perceived to come from
expanded overseas sales. These are hard to calculate. For example,
after World War II, the United States gave substantial food aid to
Japan, Germany, and Great Britain. In the 1970s, these countries
had become large commercial importers of American farm products.
Would food sales to these countries in the 1970s have been any
less if there had been no food aid in the 1950s to stimulate
subsequent trade? If so, what would be the loss to the United States
of such lowered sales? Even if answers to these questions could be
estimated somehow, further questions remain as to how much
benefit from trade gains is required to offset the food aid costs
incurred in the 1950s. What would be the appropriate compound
rate for the earlier expenditures? One can at best speculate. In
general, officials from U.S. producer and marketing groups offer a
generous interpretation of these benefits, while officials in
development agencies tend to be skeptical of the value of market
development effects. Since historically these effects were considered
important by commodity representatives, assuming rationality of
producer lobbyists, there must have been some, albeit hard to
calculate, economic benefits to a segment of the American populace.
Substantial benefits, however, are not really needed to explain or
justify food aid, since economic stability, military security, and other
foreign policy benefits have also been sought through food aid.
Political benefits have become increasingly important as the
justification for food aid, especially for donors other than the United
States. Not unrelated is the increase of concessionality in food aid.
Even in the United States, concessionality has increased with the
relative growth of Title II, and food aid’s economic value for market
development and domestic supply adjustment has declined. Political
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benefits are especially difficult to measure in monetary terms; worse,
nonmonetary evaluation is subject to great disagreement. The kinds
of political benefits from food aid range from rather diffuse claims
of an improved “climate” of relations (such as food aid to countries
like Tunisia and Kenya) to very specific political payoffs, such as
foreign policy support or military base rights in, for example, Egypt
and the Philippines.
National prestige, that is, the recognition and favorable attention
given to a food aid donor by other countries, can also be a significant
benefit. For those whose jobs and/or personal identities are closely
associated with their national community, actions that call favorable
attention to their own nation and win it respect abroad are naturally
prized. Just as philanthropists are rewarded with recognition,
flattery, and respect when their donations are given attention or
sought, so national communities (or their leaders) can derive
satisfaction from the enhanced status and respect that food aid
philanthropy provides.
Although philanthropic benefits could be derived from providing
commodities other than food, the maintenance of international norms
for minimal nutrition and humanitarian goals is more directly
advanced by food aid, whatever the argument regarding its
efficiency. Moreover, food aid rather than cash may be used by
those seeking quid pro quo political benefits because it is more
available than cash due to its diffuse “humanitarian” public support.
It may also be more available because particular domestic interest
groups, notably producers and voluntary organizations, lobby on
its behalf. Indeed, its availability, which has allowed it to be used
for pursuing foreign policy benefits rather than development or
humanitarian relief, has led some to sharply criticize the program
(Minear 1989).
The balance of costs/benefits to the United States is clearly that
costs have risen while benefits have been hard to assess. This is an
important reason for the lack of growth in the tonnage of U.S. food
aid since 1975 and for the downturn since the mid-1980s in its real
monetary amount. Certainly a need for food aid has grown (NAS
1989). While some skepticism about the value of food aid may have
undermined its attractiveness, interest in the potential positive effects
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among development economists remains substantial (Ruttan 1989).
As we saw earlier in the history of American food aid, it is seen as
having special noneconomic elements: (1) it assists particular
domestic interest groups; (2) it has a more humanitarian and popular
appeal for the American public than cash aid; and (3) it emerges as
an obligation from international bargaining. Thus, the rise in
economic costs and decline in economic benefits in the 1970s may
well have been offset by a rise in political benefits. As aid has
become a more scarce resource, food aid has become more attractive
among the economic tools available to donor country policy elites.
In the 1980s, for example, foreign policy elites saw it as an important
and valuable tool in Central America and Egypt. AID and the World
Bank have also shown interest in it as a resource for its role to help
stabilize African economies with special attention to their food
security.
Prescriptions: Targeting Food Aid and Financial
Assistance to Address Global Food Insecurity

In light of the changed world situation and our increased
knowledge of policies to achieve an effective use of food aid, the
United States should reform its food aid legislation to coordinate it
more reliably with other forms of aid that spur economic and
agricultural development and employment.
Having established the initial principles and rules under which
food aid became an institutionalized regime in international trade
(Hopkins 1984), the United States is now in a position to provide
new leadership in the international community regarding food aid.
How? By legislation that shifts the U.S. priority to recipient needs,
targets resources into areas where the use of food is most appropriate
and most efficient in promoting development and that will reduce
food insecurity, and sets a more altruistic example in its own
behavior through a greater delinking of food aid from agricultural
subsidy and protection policies. This would enhance the U.S.
position in the Uruguay Round of GATT trade negotiations for
agriculture, especially if the United States had a position on bona
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fide food aid common to other donors (meaning U.S. food aid as
grant, not loan, aid). This would also allow aid to be managed in
a way that would be more likely to induce policy coordination and
increase food provision by other industrial countries, such as
Germany and Japan.
To achieve this goal, six steps would be appropriate.
1. Establishing food needs as the principal allocation priority
for food aid.
2. Allowing for total monetization of food aid and making this
practice normal.
3. Establishing modalities whereby needed tonnages of food
aid, particularly for the most stressed populations and locales,
currently heavily in Africa, would be protected from price
fluctuations.
4. Streamlining food aid to make it fully a grant program and
one related to prospects for debt forgiveness.
5. Enhancing policy coordination and cofinancing among
donors.
6. Eliminating congressional earmarking, except for projects that
attack fundamental problems leading to food insecurity, such
as high population growth, soil erosion, forest depletion, or
the waste of harvested grain.
Some of these prescriptions have been more precisely put
forward as reforms to the existing PL 480 legislation and
implementation. The broader aim should be to establish changes
not only in U.S. procedures and rules, but in other countries that
participate in the new international regime.
The first proposed change—giving priority in allocations of food
aid to countries desperately short in domestic production and
without adequate economic purchasing power in the world market—
has an intuitive sensibility. After all, these are the countries in which
the need for food is undeniably large, while the commercial import
option to achieve food security is blocked by national poverty and
growing debt. These countries need to import food under any
circumstances. The important thing is that the food should come

Improving American Foreign Financial and Food Assistance Policies

299

in a reliable and responsive way to their needs, which vary from
year to year. This requires that other priorities, particularly
diplomatic, commercial, and bureaucratic ones, do not force the
misappropriation of food for less-efficient uses. Furthermore, inertia,
built in to the aid system through the older, multiple-purpose, annual
authorization, view of food aid, can prevent quick responses to
changes in the level of need—or type of commodity.
Food aid regulations should be formulated in a way that stabilizes
poor countries’ per capita food supplies, while at the same time
meeting one of the newer norms of food aid provision, as stipulated
in the Bellmon Amendment of 1979, namely to prevent harm to local
markets and producers. Following this scenario, the top 10 countries
for U.S. grant or bona fide food aid (not Title I) would not include
India, Egypt, or El Salvador, all countries where the United States is
the dominant and nearly sole provider. Rather, the allocation of
grant funds would be substantially redirected towards countries with
high rates of environmental threat, malnutrition, and high population
growth, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Bangladesh, and a
number of other smaller African states. The food security allocation
criteria of the Leahy-Lugar bill, as introduced in April 1990, would
mandate such direction.
The second recommendation is that food normally be sold in |
the recipient country, regardless of the modality through which it If
is provided. This forces more attention to the true value of specific
commodities, moves food into appropriate markets (such as wheat p
to cities), reduces transport costs, and then raises the total caloric |
amount available to targeted populations when local, more ap- I
propriate foods are purchased to use in food-for-work, mother/child
health centers, or emergency refugee camps by U.S. voluntary
organizations or ministries of the recipient country.
.
Since price fluctuations pose a special problem for food security
and may well be substantial in the 1990s, a third recommendation
is to provide stability in food resources targeted to needy countries
and peoples, especially for extremely vulnerable states in Africa.
The creation of a special, earmarked, no-year account for Africa,
similar to subminimums already used (in the Title II legislation),
could guarantee greater security for the special needs in Africa. An
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African tonnage subminimum would guarantee food for Africa and
reduce the prospect that people in the world’s poorest countries
will have to share disproportionately the costs of instability in world
food markets in the 1990s. With appropriate links to policy in
recipient countries, this subminimum need not have a disincentive
effect. Interest in Africa in the United States, however, is not high
enough to make this proposed legisltively probable.
The fourth recommendation is to redraft the authorizing legis
lation so that food aid becomes entirely a grant program. Titles 1/
III, with their concessional sales—useful for market development
and political payment for base rights or other foreign policy goals—
could be moved to a separate place in the Farm Bill. Benefits of
this change would appeal to farm groups if greater scope of authority
for use by USDA, the State, and Treasury Departments were
stipulated. The purposes of subsidized food exports from the U.S.
government, including market development, surplus disposal, and
foreign policy support, would be streamlined. Again, the LeahyLugar bill takes a step in this direction. Alternatively, a more
autonomous Title I could remain in the development assistance
account, although it more appropriately belongs, I believe, in the
export promotion account, nested with other export subsidy
programs.
This splitting of Title I leaves, roughly, a billion dollars of grant
funds per year provided by the development assistance account for
U.S. food to be used for development purposes. This is a reasonable
target. Under this fourth recommendation, grant aid becomes all
of PL 480, while Title I becomes a separately legislated export
promotion and foreign policy program. PL 480 reflows, plus other
funds sought by USDA, the State Department, or the Treasury
Department for ensuring U.S. commercial market shares or
addressing debt issues could be authorized for use for these trade
and natural security issues.
This separation of programs would provide a double bargaining
asset in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The grant food
aid program would send aid to those countries where food can be
a valuable resource in attacking the particular problems associated
with food insecurity and hunger (and thus conform to concerns
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expressed in the United States and GATT draft on food security).
The export program could be a more direct counter to other
countries’ agricultural subsidies, and could be a subject for GATT
negotiations.
Fifth, in rewriting PL 480, Congress should provide incentives
for other countries to coordinate and cooperate with the United
States in overseas undertakings using food aid. This would be
desirable in order to raise world levels of food aid. Reform of the
U.S. program should encourage other donors, such as Japan, to view
more positively the leadership and collaboration of it and make it
easier for them to utilize U.S. farm commodities in their food aid
programs. If the United States adopted the first recommendation
(a need approach), it could negotiate with other donors to match
or exceed the United States in contributions. Other donors’ grants
should grow substantially, as they once did from 1968-78. Otherwise,
in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the United States will
have to defend its call for reduction of barriers against the allegation
of inconsistencies in the United States’s own program, to wit. Title
I programs used for “unfair” market competition as measured by
free trade principles.
A sixth reform is to reduce radically the earmarking of both food
aid allocation and use of local currency proceeds. Earmarks for use
of local currency are cumbersome and inefficient. Their purpose
might appropriately be maintained in the legislation much in the
manner of the Bellmon Amendment. This requirement, that the
secretary of agriculture affirm that any food aid provided will not
adversely affect local production or national/international marketing,
could be a model for any other congressional constraints. For
example, in requiring food aid to be targeted to alleviate food
insecurity Congress need not legislate specific modalities, which can
change. Another “amendment” could require that priority be given
to environmental concerns, such as improved and more efficient
agricultural techniques.
Detailed prescriptions in PL 480, however, requiring use of
specific kinds, such as private entrepreneurs, should be eliminated.
Uses of local currency, however, should continue to give high
priority to attacking pressures on arable land and the rapid
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environmental deterioration in many countries. Irrigation,
reforestation, research on production, and other national and
international collective benefits—especially to agriculture—should
be central to projects supported by food aid.
If food aid allowed recipients to exploit less heavily the marginal
soils of Africa and Latin America and to protect the environment
more generally, its allocation would be closer to serving the longer
term interests of the United States. Furthermore, such uses would
be especially attractive for cofinancing with other countries, possibly
under the aegis of the World Bank, which already is encouraging
such steps. Particular projects, such as food-for-work programs,
might be supported by food from the U.S. and food and cash from
other donors. Currently, projects developed using food aid are often
widely scattered geographically and functionally; they are seldom
integrated into national food needs or linked to food production
and distribution of the recipient country.
A U.S. priority for integrating projects around a food security
objective would be evidence of U.S. leadership. This would be
especially resonant among the economically sophisticated members
in the aid community, consistent with the current GATT negotiations
concern with food security, and could be more successfully
monitored by congressional oversight.
Conclusions

The United States remains the world’s largest exporter of grains,
the largest provider of food assistance, and the most complex policy
implementor. Detailed legislative requirements, however, often
create undesirable constraints and complex configurations for policy
implementation. They can even create disincentives within the
bureaucracy and become sources of amusement and scorn among
political scientists. Although Congress has often been successful in
earmarking specific projects or in initiating higher standards for
performance, its efforts have inconsistent effects. Rather than
streamlined, efficient management resulting, often the complications
that are built into the legislation (as in the case of Title III) yield the
net opposite of what was intended.
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Furthermore, as the 1990s unfold, the world’s most food insecure
countries remain extremely vulnerable. Food aid and other efforts
to provide backup options to shocks received by poor countries’
food systems do not provide adequate guarantees. Furthermore,
what food aid is provided is not allocated in relative proportion to
levels of insecurity. While many highly food insecure countries suffer
from declining agricultural productivity, increasing deforestation, and
high population growth rates, a fair number are given relatively low
priority in allocating U.S. food aid. In fact, among the top 20
recipients of U.S. food aid in 1987, there was only a modest and
nonsignificant correlation between degrees of need and per capita
aid. Even in a country like El Salvador, which has rapid
deforestation, generous U.S. programs have largely ignored
production and environment problems while providing several times
the amount of aid need would dictate. This is equally true in Africa
where much aid has been dumped under the guise of emergency
feeding (that is, free food).
An overwhelming case can be made for changing regime
practices. A major start would be to target grant food to food
insecure states, tying it to support of appropriate food policy and
macroeconomic reforms. Currently, food aid provided to the most
needy countries comes disproportionately from other countries than
the United States. Thus, the United States has fallen behind in taking
leadership to address global food needs and alleviate/prevent
emergencies. Potentially explosive situations are developing in the
highly concentrated urban populations emerging in the Third World.
Cognizance of this danger is required; otherwise urban-based
political pressure will accelerate the mining of the earth’s soils in
the next decade in these poor states.
Recognition of the problems just reviewed has already given rise
to some changes in the world’s food aid regime and in the attention
food and food aid receives among specialized development agencies,
notably the World Bank. In I960, the bank spurned the idea of
using food aid. At that point, the principles of food aid were at
variance with those of the bank. These initial principles were that
food aid was to come from donors’ surpluses, to add to total trade,
to be provided on an annual ad hoc basis, and to be used to promote
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commercial trade or to address emergency humanitarian needs.
By 1990 other principles, largely contradictory to the founding
ones, have arisen. Now principles of market efficiency and
development gains rather than exceptionalism and diplomatic gains
have been articulated, most notably by the multilateral food
legislature, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs of
the World Food Programs. These propose that food aid should (1)
be supplied most efficiently, (2) be a substitute for a recipient’s food
imports, (3) be given under longer term commitments, and (4)
provide development investments for recipients. Development
economists, international organizations, hunger lobby groups, and
voluntary agencies have all espoused these principles.
Each of these newer four principles should be incorporated in
future U.S. legislation, replacing the remaining elements of the older
ones still embodied in the original legislation. In some cases, as
with other established U.S. programs, although new principles have
been openly advocated by food aid specialists based on expert
consensus, such ideas are not well received by some U.S. budgetary
authorities, foreign policy officials, or commodity interests.
The Leahy-Lugar Senate bill for legislation in the 1990 Farm Bill
is congruent with these new international principles. The key
recommendation is that food aid should go to poor countries most
in need of food imports to meet nutrition deficiencies. Such food
insecurity should become the principal priority of food aid per se.
As such, food aid could better attack the very conditions and causes
that justify its existence. Its aims, therefore, would be:
1. The need to improve agricultural production through
practices that do not threaten the environment and that take
advantage of the most appropriate technology.
2. The support of regional, national, and international markets
to smooth out instabilities in domestic food supply and
reduce the need for grant food imports in the longer term.
3. The design of flexible, environmentally targeted inter
ventions, perhaps using cash-for-work from food sales
proceeds, in which donors, such as the United States and
Japan, would provide cofinancing.
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With such an emphasis, I believe, the prospect for cofinancing
with other donors who could provide both cash and food inputs to
longer term efforts seems promising. The World Bank has begun
efforts to initiate a framework for such cooperation. Significant aid
donors that are not large food exporters, such as Germany and Japan,
have exhibited a willingness to associate their financing when such
efforts are not competitive with their own domestic industries.
The proposals outlined here call for reform of food aid. The
United States, as its principal founder and major contributor (both
to its substance and its rules), is the natural leader to press for such
reform. It is well placed to assert leadership in attacking food
insecurity. The 1990 PL 480 reauthorization affords a chance to
reform anachronistic elements in the U.S. law, to contribute to related
objectives, such as a liberal trading order, and to simplify food aid
to make it more effective, less cumbersome, and more dedicated to
the central tasks of economic development and hunger alleviation.
New knowledge about world food needs and effective uses of
food aid provide a basis for specific steps for regime reform.
Leadership in this realm requires taking advantage of the developed
world’s rich agricultural productivity and surplus food capability.
Along with a concern for efficient world agricultural production,
the rationale for food aid calls for rich countries to both donate food
and to direct the use of this food more centrally toward the goals
of protecting people and reducing vulnerability to acute and chronic
hunger (World Bank 1988).
Notes

1. The claim for a normative consensus rests on the growing
acceptance of human rights that include material goods, as discussed
by political philosophers, such as Amartya Sen in Poverty and
Famines (X9^V), and the success of organizations, such as the Hunger
Project, Bread for the World, and other lobbying and promotional
organizations formed in the 1970s, which focus on the issue of
hunger, the establishment of the Select Committee on Hunger in
the U.S. House of Representatives, and the results of national public
opinion surveys.
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2. It should be understood that the U.S. global interest is not
essentially altruistic. The United States, as the major food exporter,
has an interest in a stable growing demand for food imports. Just
as Saudi Arabia in the 1970s recognized the interest it had in stable
oil markets and to import capacity for poor countries through its
major contribution to the establishment of a special oil facility in
the IMF during the 1970s, so the United States has an interest in
alleviating poor countries’ inability to import goods it exports.
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